Unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) was considered impossible. But the no-go proofs are based on the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters (HJW) theorem (a.k.a. the Uhlmann theorem). Recently, it was found that in high-dimensional systems, there exist some states which can display a chaos effect in quantum steering, so that the attack strategy based on the HJW theorem has to require the capability of discriminating quantum states with very subtle difference, to the extent that is not allowed by the uncertainty principle. With the help of this finding, here we propose a simple QBC protocol which manages to evade the no-go proofs.
Introduction
Besides the well-known quantum key distribution [1] , bit commitment (BC) is another essential cryptographic primitive. It is a two-party cryptography including two phases. In the commit phase, Alice decides the value of the bit b (b = 0 or 1) that she wants to commit, and sends Bob a piece of evidence, e.g. some quantum states. Later, in the unveil phase, Alice announces the value of b, and Bob checks it with the evidence. An unconditionally secure BC protocol needs to be both binding (i.e. Alice cannot change the value of b after the commit phase) and concealing (Bob cannot know b before the unveil phase).
BC is closely related with many other cryptographic tasks, e.g. coin tossing [1] and oblivious transfer [2, 3] , all of which are the building blocks for even more complicated multi-party secure computation protocols [4] . Unfortunately, it is widely accepted that unconditionally secure quantum BC (QBC) is impossible
where all |i together with |0 form an orthonormal basis of the corresponding n-dimensional system β, then an interesting result occurs. That is, the two corresponding measurements M 0 and M 1 can become arbitrarily close to each other when n increases. As we know, the precision of any measurement device is restricted by the quantum uncertainty principle. Consequently, when two measurements are getting extremely close, they will eventually become indistinguishable. Basing on these observations, in this paper we will build a QBC protocol which can evade the no-go proofs.
In the next section, we will elaborate the conjunction between the HJW theorem and the nogo proofs (i.e. the original MLC theorem and its expansions) of unconditionally secure QBC. Then in §3, we will review briefly the anomalous result found in [45] . Our QBC protocol will be presented in §4, with its security against Alice and Bob being proven in §5 and §7, respectively. Section 6 elaborates the role of the uncertainty principle in the security proof against Alice, and §8 gives a technical remark on the mathematical method used in the security proof against Bob. The significance of the result, especially its impact on the possible development of fundamental theories, will be addressed in §9.
No-go proofs and the Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters theorem
Let us first review briefly the general features of the no-go proofs of QBC .
(I) The reduced model. Following the presentation of [7] , in these proofs any QBC protocol can be rephrased as the following general procedure.
(1) Alice prepares the state can begin the QBC protocol described by the reduced model by preparing system α ⊗ β in such a state that β alone has density matrix ρ β 0 . Then she skips the measurement in step (2) so that α and β remain entangled throughout the commit phase. In the unveil phase, since equation (2.2) is satisfied, the HJW theorem ensures that she can unveil the state of β as either |ψ 0 i β or |ψ 1 i β at her will, simply by choosing between the two measurements M 0 , M 1 mentioned in the HJW theorem (as summarized in Introduction) on α.
In other words (as in the presentation in [7] ), Alice can start the protocol with |Ω 0 as described in equation (2.1) and skips step (2) . Later if she wants to unveil b = 0, she simply measures α in the basis {|ζ 0 i α } (equivalent to applying measurement M 0 ) in step (4). Or if she wants to unveil b = 1, all she needs is to apply a unitary transformation U to rotate her measurement basis from {|ζ 0 i α } to {|ζ 1 i α }, or equivalently, apply the transformation U † on α which maps |Ω 0 into |Ω 1 , then still measure it in the basis {|ζ 0 i α } (both are equivalent to applying measurement M 1 ). Consequently, Alice needs not to determine the value of b until the unveil phase. That is, a concealing QBC protocol cannot be binding, so that unconditionally secure QBC deems impossible.
Note that the HJW theorem applies only to the case where ρ After the early appearance of the MLC no-go theorem [5] [6] [7] , there were many newer no-go proofs which enriched the above-reduced model in different aspects so that they can be more general and rigorous. But the HJW theorem is always the base of the final step of their cheating strategies, though sometimes not explicitly cited.
In the literature, there were attempts on building QBC which challenge either the above feature (I) or (II) (see [36, [46] [47] [48] and references therein). But we will present a QBC protocol which satisfies the features (I) and (II), while the cheating strategy (III) does not work. This is based on a recent discovery on quantum steering, as reviewed below.
Chaos in steering in high-dimensional systems
Very recently, it was found that in high-dimensional systems, there exists a specific form of bipartite quantum system which can display a kind of chaos effect when being adopted for steering [45] . More specifically, let us take ψ 0 i 's and ψ 1 i 's mentioned in the above description of the HJW theorem as the two sets of evenly distributed states {φ i+ } and {φ i− } in equations (1.1) and (1.2), and denote their density matrices as ρ + and ρ − , respectively. It was proven in [45] that the trace distance between ρ + and ρ − is
Therefore, ρ + and ρ − can be arbitrarily close to each other with the increase of n. But for any finite n, ρ + = ρ − cannot be satisfied rigorously so that the HJW theorem cannot be applied directly. Thus, Alice cannot expect to find a bipartite system α ⊗ β such that her local measurements on α alone can steer the state of β from an element of {|φ i+ } to an element of {|φ i− } with a probability equals exactly to 1. Now let us study what happens if Alice tries to steer the state of β to another state which is very close to an element of {|φ i− }, as described above in Alice's cheating strategy on ε-concealing QBC protocols.
Suppose that Alice prepares a bipartite system α ⊗ β in the state
Here {|α i+ α , i = 0, . . . , n − 1} is an orthonormal basis of the n-dimensional system α (the subscripts α and β will be omitted thereafter). Obviously, there is:
Result 3.1. For any i, if Alice projects α into |α i+ , then β will collapse into |φ i+ . Now we will try to find the measurement on α which can make β collapse to a state close to |φ i− . Defining
and
For a given i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, if Alice can project system α to |α i− , then equation (3.6) shows that system β will collapse to
where 
i.e. |φ i− is indeed very close to |φ i− . Now let us study the relationship between the states in results 3.1 and 3.2. From equation (3.5), we find
i.e. |α i+ and |α i− are very close to each other when n is high. By contrast, multiplying φ i+ | by the right-hand side of equation (3.7), we have
for any n, i.e. |φ i+ and |φ i− are always strictly orthogonal to each other. Therefore, combining results 3.1 and 3.2, we obtain the conclusion mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, that for the bipartite state |Ω in equation (3.2), a subtle difference in the measurement results on α can steer β into completely orthogonal states. Note that when n is finite, for any i = i , equation (3.5) shows that α i − |α i− = 0, so that {|α i− , i = 0, . . . , n − 1} cannot be used as an orthogonal measurement basis. Thus, it generally takes a positive-operator valued measure (POVM) to project α to an element of {|α i− }. But with the fact that |α i+ and |α i− are very close to each other, it is clear that the measurement/POVM M + and M − for projecting α to an element of {|α i+ } or {|α i− }, respectively, also become arbitrarily close to each other as n increases. This is one of the key feature that leads to our QBC protocol.
Our protocol
Since proving that secure QBC exists even only in theory already has great significance (as indicated by the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson (CBH) theorem that we will address in the Discussion section), here for simplicity, we only consider the ideal case without practical imperfections, such as transmission errors, detection loss or dark counts, etc. Under this setting, we propose the following protocol.
Our In brief, the protocol can be secure against Alice's cheating, as long as the quantum uncertainty principle puts an upper bound on the precision of her measurement devices, so that she cannot discriminate quantum states with very little difference, which was required for implementing the attack based on the HJW theorem against the specific states {ψ 0 i } and {ψ 1 i } in equations ( 
That is, the key of the security of our protocol that makes it different from previous insecure ones, is the specific form of the states {ψ 0 i } and {ψ 1 i } in equations (1.1) and (1.2). These particular states have the property that if Alice wants to introduce an ancilla system so that she can steer Bob's system between {ψ 0 i } and {ψ 1 i }, then the two required measurements on her ancilla system will be arbitrarily close to each other. Thus, the discrimination of the two measurements can be ruled out by the uncertainty principle. On the contrary, the states used in previous insecure QBC protocols (e.g. [1] ) do not have this property, so that the two measurements required for the steering is always highly distinguishable to Alice, leaving rooms for her to cheat. Now let us give the security proof in details.
Security against dishonest Alice
It is trivial to show that in the commit phase of our QBC protocol, if Alice sends Bob each register Ψ j honestly in a pure state ψ b
2 non-entangled with any other system, then she cannot unveil the committed bit asb. This is because
, so that no matter how Alice chooses the value of i j of each j, the total probability for her to announce the states of all the s registers as ψb i j instead of the actual ψ b i j without being caught is bounded by (1/4) s , which is arbitrarily close to 0 for a sufficiently high s value. Now consider Alice's general attack using entangled states. For each register Ψ j sent to Bob, the state of Alice's and Bob's combined system α ⊗ β can always be written as
where λ i j denotes the superposition coefficient. We must emphasize that this form covers all possible states that dishonest Alice may use. For example, even if she entangles different registers Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 , . . . , Ψ j , . . ., we can still single out Ψ j as Bob's system β in this equation, while treating all other Ψ j (j = j) as a part of Alice's system α. We also assume that she has full control over system α (although in fact she could not do so if α includes other Ψ j ), so that the security analysis below covers the upper bound of Alice's cheating probability. In this case, if {|β i j + β , i j = 1, . . . , n A − 1} contains any element not belonging to {ψ 0 i = |φ i+ , i = 1, . . . , n − 1} defined in equation (1.1), and/or {|α i j + α , i j = 1, . . . , n A − 1} is not an orthogonal basis of α, then Alice cannot always unveil the state of Ψ j as ψ 0 i with the correct i value. Suppose that the error rate is η, then for all the s registers, her probability of unveiling b = 0 successfully is at the order of magnitude of (1 − η) s , which is trivial for high s. Therefore, to ensure that she can unveiling b = 0 without being caught, {|α i j + α } has to be chosen as an orthogonal basis of α, and {|β i j + β } must be n A − 1 elements selected from {|φ i+ , i = 1, . . . , n − 1}. Without loss of generality, here we suppose that she chooses the first n A − 1 ones in order, i.e. {|β i j + β = |φ i j + , i j = 1, . . . , n A − 1}, and each |φ i j + is chosen with the equal probability. Omitting the subscript j, we have .2), except that n is replaced by n A . Thus, the analysis in the previous subsection still applies. That is, expanding this |Ω in the basis {|φ i− β } which are the states for committing b = 1, and it will take the form of equation (3.6) by replacing n by n A . The last term √ 2/n A |α n A − |φ n A − in equation (3.6) shows that system β has a probability 2/n A to be projected into |φ n A − = (|0 +
n A , which is not a legitimate state for committing b = 1, and it is also orthogonal to all legitimate states |φ i− (i = 1, . . . , n A − 1). Then Alice's announcing b = 1 stands at least the probability 2/n A to be caught cheating for each register, and the total probability for her to pass Bob's check on all the s registers is not greater than
which drops exponentially to 0 as s increases. Also, equation (5.3) is merely a loose upper bound because as we mentioned, {|α i− } in equation (3.6) is not an orthogonal basis for any finite n. Meanwhile, equation (3.9) shows that |φ i− does not equal to |φ i− exactly when n is finite. Therefore, it is impossible for Alice to discriminate unambiguously which |φ i− (i = 1, . . . , n) is the one that Bob's system β will collapse to, so that Alice's actual probability for passing Bob's check on all the s registers will be even smaller than equation (5.3).
More importantly, it is doubtful whether any measurement device can be adjusted with unlimited precision. Let us assume that there exists a limit on the precision of Alice's measurement device, so that it cannot have unlimited power on discriminating quantum states that are very close to each other. Under this assumption, if Alice chooses an extremely high n A value, |α i+ and |α i− will become so close (as shown by equation (3.10) ), that no physical device in the world can help her distinguish them apart. Consequently, whether β collapses to |φ i+ or |φ i− becomes completely out of her control. That is, for any physical implementation of our protocol, the limit on the precision of Alice's device puts a limit on the maximum of the n A value that she can choose (denoted as n A max ), such that she can discriminate |α i+ and |α i− and thus steer Bob's system β only if she chooses n A ≤ n A max . But she cannot do so anymore if she chooses n A > n A max . As a result, basing on the principle limit on the closest |α i+ and |α i− that can be discriminated by the measurement devices actually used in the protocol, Bob can determine n A max beforehand according to equation (3.10) (the exact value will depend on the specific implementation scheme though, so we cannot have a general estimation here). Then with equation (5.3), we know that for any expected value p A max , by choosing
Bob can be sure that the probability of Alice's successful cheating is bounded by p ≤ p A max .
Although such a value of s could be very high in practice, as long as it is finite, it will be useful for disproving the claim that unconditionally secure QBC is impossible in principle.
Limit on the precision of measurement devices
In the above, we assumed that Alice's measurement device has a limited precision. Here we show that it is indeed possible to meet this assumption in general. The detailed reason can be found in sections 3.1, 5.1 and 5.2 of [49] . In brief, as summarized in [50] , in principle, any linear measurement of a quantum observable of a system under study that does not commute with itself at different times leads to such limits on precision. This is because any indirect measurement involves at least two parties, an Object and a Meter. The Object is the system with the observablex that we want to measure. The Meter is the system couple to the Object for us to inferx by recording a chosen observableÔ of this system. The Meter acts on the Object during each measurement, usually via a quantityF conjugate to the readout observableÔ, thus perturbing the value of measured observablex and modifying the results of subsequent measurements. This is known as back action of the Meter on the system under measurement. At the same time, quantum mechanics prescribes that readout observable of the Meter should have an inherent uncertainty δÔ, additive to and independent of the value of the measured quantityx. This one is known as measurement imprecision. Because of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, this imprecision cannot be arbitrary and is linked to the back-action perturbation by the uncertainty relation
In our protocol, as mentioned in the paragraph below equation (5.3) , {|α i− } in equation (3.6) (being defined in equation (3.5)) is not an orthogonal basis for any finite n. Therefore, if Alice wants to unveil b = 1, to determine which |α i− her system α collapses to, she needs a positive-operator valued measure (POVM) that requires an ancilla system to perform indirect measurements. Thus, the above discussion applies.
For example, consider that our protocol is implemented using optical devices. When n A in the previous section rises to an extremely high (but still finite) value, |α i+ and |α i− can become so close to each other that distinguishing them will require extremely subtle adjustment on Alice's measurement device (such as controlling the width of the slits in interference systems, twisting the angles of the lens, etc.), which falls within the Planck scale. According to [51] , 'to measure anything the size of Planck length, the photon momentum needs to be very large due to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and so much energy in such a small space would create a tiny Black hole with the diameter of its event horizon equal to a Planck length'. Obviously, if n A rises even further so that |α i+ and |α i− become even closer, distinguishing them will be impossible, both theoretically and practically. This guarantees that the upper bound n A max has a finite value, so that equation (5.4) ensures that there exists a finite value of s which can keep our protocol secure against Alice's cheating.
Security against dishonest Bob
As mentioned above, it was proven in [45] that the density matrices ρ + , ρ − for {ψ 0 i }, {ψ 1 i } defined in equations (1.1) and (1.2), respectively, have a trace distance that satisfies equation (3.1) . Also, the n B value in our protocol is irrelevant with dishonest Alice's n A and can be chosen to be much higher than s. Obviously, the concealing condition equation (2.2) is satisfied. Therefore, the states are completely indistinguishable to Bob before the unveil phase, so that the protocol is perfectly secure against his cheating.
A technical remark on taking the n → ∞ limit
Some might wonder whether it is legitimate to take the n → ∞ limit in equation (3.1) and the related equations in [45] , because we are studying the two sets of evenly distributed states defined in equations (1.1) and (1.2), where each state occurs with the equal probability 1/(n − 1). When n → ∞ this probability becomes 0 which does not seem to make sense. Here, we would like to clarify that the n → ∞ limit we used is following Cauchy's (ε, δ)-definition of limit. That is, from equation (3.1), we can obtain physically), there is |D(ρ + , ρ − ) − 0| < ε. This method of definition can be found in [52] , where it also mentioned that such a definition of the limit lim x→c f (x) = L is true while 'the function f need not even be defined at c'. That is, in our case it means that lim n→∞ D(ρ + , ρ − ) = 0 can be true even if D(ρ + , ρ − ) cannot be defined at exactly the n = ∞ point. Thus, we can safely say that ρ + and ρ − are arbitrarily close to each other in the n → ∞ limit. Moreover, we should always keep in mind that the actual question related to our QBC protocol against Bob's cheating is: when honest Alice randomly selects a state from {|φ i+ , i = 1, . . . , n − 1} or {|φ i− , i = 1, . . . , n − 1}, can dishonest Bob distinguish which set it is from? Surely Alice can still make such a selection when n → ∞, and each state can be picked in a completely random way without any bias even though we may not write the probability as 1/(n − 1). Also, honest Alice does not really have to pick from an infinite set. She can pick from a finite set instead, as long as she keeps the upper bound of n in equations (1.1) and (1.2) secret from Bob, so that they appear to Bob as if there are infinite choices of the states. Meanwhile, the fact that the trace distance satisfies D(ρ + , ρ − ) = 1/ √ n − 1 for any finite n clearly shows that distinguishing ρ + and ρ − becomes harder and harder as n increases. Thus, it is natural to conclude that it will be even harder for Bob to distinguish whether a state is picked from {|φ i+ } or {|φ i− } when n → ∞. Therefore, the security of our protocol against dishonest Bob stays valid no matter whether the above density matrix description of the states is adopted or not.
Discussion
Although we merely showed the theoretical existence of unconditionally secure QBC without studying its feasibility in practice, the result is still very important. It re-opens the venues for cryptographic tasks that were once closed by the no-go proofs based on the HJW theorem, such as quantum coin flipping and two-party secure computations [53] .
But more importantly, it also contributes to the development of fundamental theories. There is an interesting result called the CBH theorem [54] , which is an inspiring attempt to raise some information-theoretic constraints to the level of fundamental laws of Nature, from which quantum theory can be deduced. These constraints were suggested to be three 'no-go's', which are (I) the impossibility of superluminal information transfer, (II) the impossibility of perfectly broadcasting of an unknown state and (III) the impossibility of unconditionally secure BC. But recently, Heunen & Kissinger [55] suggested that the impossibility of BC is not caused by the conceptual structure of quantum theory, but by the algebraic model assumed in [54] . Logically, this may indicate that the fundamental axioms of quantum theory alone do not necessarily lead to the impossibility of BC. Thus, our finding (that QBC can be secure in infinite-dimensional systems) seems to be in good agreement with this result. Therefore, we may need to seek for another information-theoretic principle as the third constraint in the CBH theorem. Or we will have to add 'strictly infinite-dimensional systems do not exist' as an additional axiom to keep the no-go proofs of QBC valid.
Manipulating infinite-dimensional systems may indeed be hard in practice if we want to use physical systems with an infinite number of energy levels, because it may imply an infinitely high energy. But there could be tricks to use other degree of freedoms instead. Continuous variable systems [56] [57] [58] could be a potential choice. But we should also note that an observable whose value can change continuously does not necessarily lead to an infinite-dimensional system. For example, the polarization angle θ of a photon can take continuous values so that there are infinite choices. But most of the states (e.g. the θ = 0 • polarized and the θ = 5 • polarized states) are not orthogonal to each other. On the contrary, our protocol needs a system with an infinite number of orthogonal states. Therefore, implementing our protocol in practice still demands careful designs. We will study such practical implementations in successive works.
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